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Abstract
Multiple price lists have emerged as a simple and popular method for eliciting risk pref-
erences. Despite their popularity, a key downside of multiple price lists has not been widely
recognized - namely that the approach is unlikely to generate sufficient information to accu-
rately identify different dimensions of risk preferences. The most popular theories of decision
making under risk posit that preference for risk are driven by a combination of two factors:
the curvature of the utility function and the extent to which probabilities are weighted non-
linearly. In this paper, we show that the widely used multiple price list introduced by Holt
and Laury (2002) is likely more accurate at eliciting the latter, and we construct a different
multiple price list that is likely more accurate at eliciting the former. We show that by
combining information from different multiple price lists, greater predictive performance can
be achieved.
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1 Introduction
The abundance of uncertainty in life has prompted a great many investigations into
humans’ response to risk. The interest in understanding risk preferences has created a latent
demand for effective, easy-to-use risk preference elicitation devices. Following a long line of
previous research by Becker et al. (1964), Binswanger (1980, 1981), and many others, in 2002
Holt and Laury (H&L) introduced a risk preference elicitation method that has subsequently
become a mainstay. In a testament to the general interest in risk preference elicitation and to
the specific appeal of the approach introduced by H&L, their work has been cited more than
2,200 times according to Google Scholar and is the second most highly cited paper published
by the American Economic Review since 2002 according to ISIs Web of Knowledge. The
approach used by H&L has subsequently come to be referred to as a type of multiple price
list (MPL) (Andersen et al., 2006; Harrison and Rutstro¨m, 2008), an approach thought to
have been first used by Miller et al. (1969).1 The key advantage of the MPL is its ease of
use. Respondents make a series of consecutive choices between two outcomes, where the
expected value of one outcome increases at a higher rate than the other. The point at which
an individual switches from choosing one outcome over the other is often used as a measure
of risk aversion.
Despite the fact that MPLs are easy to use and easy for participants to understand,
the approach has some weaknesses. Harrison et al. (2005) pointed out that inferences from
MPLs can be influenced by order effects (see also Holt and Laury, 2005), and Andersen
et al. (2006) discussed the potential for choices in MPLs to be influenced by the ranges of
values used. Here, we point to a more fundamental problem with MPLs that seems to have
been overlooked by practitioners. In particular, the H&L approach is subject to Wakker and
Deneffe’s (1996) critique that many risk preference elicitation methods confound estimates
of the curvature of the utility function (i.e., the traditional notion of risk preference) with an
1The word “multiple” in multiple price list is redundant since the word “list” already implies repetitive
choices. Nevertheless, we adopt the phrasing MPL in this paper as it is more commonly used in the literature
than other variants such as “choice list.”
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estimate of the extent to which an individual weights probabilities non-linearly. These are two
conceptually different constructs that have different implications for individuals’ behavior
under risk, and without controlling for one, biased estimates of the other are obtained.
This observation about MPLs is well known to experts in the field of risk preference
elicitation, and yet in our experience, it is not well known to newcomers or those outside
the field. The purpose of this paper is to further elucidate some of these issues and more
widely disseminate this knowledge among the (apparently large) audience of individuals
interested in risk preference elicitation. Moreover, while we agree that the use of a single
“choice list” or MPL, may not perform well in fully capturing the multidimensional aspects
of risk preferences, it must be acknowledged that their popularity results from ease of use.
Accordingly, in this paper, we show that different types of MPLs are better able to capture
some risk dimensions than others and that by using two (or more) easy to use MPLs, a
researcher might achieve a more balanced picture of risk preferences, and thus might attain
improved predictive validity.2
In what follows, we show that H&L’s original MPL is, perhaps ironically, not particularly
well suited to measuring the traditional notion of risk preferences - the curvature of the
utility function. Rather, it is likely to provide a better approximation to the curvature of
the probability weighting function. We then introduce an alternative MPL that has exactly
the opposite property. By combining the information gained from both types of MPLs, we
show that greater prediction performance can be attained.
2 Effect of Probability Weighting in MPLs
In the base-line MPL used by H&L, individuals were asked to make a series of 10 decisions
between two options (see Table 1). In option A, the high payoff amount is fixed at $2 and
the low payoff amount is fixed at $1.60 across all 10 decision tasks. In option B, the high
2If interest rests solely in creating a single index of risk preference without committing to a single theory,
there are some relatively simple methods available such as the one shown in exercise 3.6.3 in Wakker (2010).
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payoff amount is fixed at $3.85 and the low payoff amount is fixed at $0.10. The only thing
changing across the 10 decisions are the probabilities assigned to the high and low payoffs.
Initially the probability of receiving the high payoff is 0.10 but by the tenth decision task,
the probability is 1.0.
Table 1: The H&L Multiple Price List
Lottery A Lottery B EVA
(e)
EVB
(e)
Difference
(e)
Open CRRA interval if
subject switches to Lot-
tery B (assumes EUT)p e p e p e p e
0.1 2.00 0.9 1.60 0.1 3.85 0.9 0.10 1.640 0.475 1.17 −∞ -1.71
0.2 2.00 0.8 1.60 0.2 3.85 0.8 0.10 1.680 0.850 0.83 -1.71 -0.95
0.3 2.00 0.7 1.60 0.3 3.85 0.7 0.10 1.720 1.225 0.50 -0.95 -0.49
0.4 2.00 0.6 1.60 0.4 3.85 0.6 0.10 1.760 1.600 0.16 -0.49 -0.15
0.5 2.00 0.5 1.60 0.5 3.85 0.5 0.10 1.800 1.975 -0.18 -0.15 0.14
0.6 2.00 0.4 1.60 0.6 3.85 0.4 0.10 1.840 2.350 -0.51 0.14 0.41
0.7 2.00 0.3 1.60 0.7 3.85 0.3 0.10 1.880 2.725 -0.85 0.41 0.68
0.8 2.00 0.2 1.60 0.8 3.85 0.2 0.10 1.920 3.100 -1.18 0.68 0.97
0.9 2.00 0.1 1.60 0.9 3.85 0.1 0.10 1.960 3.475 -1.52 0.97 1.37
1 2.00 0 1.60 1 3.85 0 0.10 2.000 3.850 -1.85 1.37 +∞
Note: Last four columns showing expected values and implied CRRA intervals were not
shown to subjects.
The expected value of lottery A exceeds the expected value of lottery B for the first four
decision tasks. Thus, someone who prefers lottery A for the first four decision tasks and
then switches and prefers lottery B for the remainder is often said to have near-risk neutral
preferences. Analysts often use the number of “safe choices” (the number of times option A
was chosen) or the A-B switching point to describe risk preferences and to infer the shape
of an assumed utility function (Bellemare and Shearer, 2010; Bruner et al., 2008; Eckel and
Wilson, 2004; Glockner and Hochman, 2011; Lusk and Coble, 2005).
Perhaps the first thing that should be noted about the original H&L MPL is that it
entails choices made over only four dollar amounts (0.10, 1.60, 2.00 and 3.85). Because a
utility function is unique only up to an affine transformation, one must fix two of these points
and can only identify the relative difference implied by the other two. Stated differently, the
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original H&L MPL reveals little information about the curvature of the utility function.3
By contrast, the H&L MPLs entails choices over 11 different probability amounts (from 0
to 1 in increments of 0.1). Thus, the approach contains much more information about the
potential shape of the probability weighting function over the entire probability domain.
To more formally address these issues, assume peoples preferences are represented by
rank-dependent utility theory introduced by Quiggin (1982) and incorporated into cumula-
tive prospect theory by Tversky and Kahneman (1992). Applying the theory to the H&L
MPL, the rank-dependent utility of option A is RDUA = w(p)U(2) + (1 − w(p))U(1.6)
and the rank-dependent utility of option B is RDUB = w(p)U(3.85) + (1 − w(p))U(0.1),
where p is the probability of receiving the higher payoff amount in each option. A person
chooses option A over B when RDUA > RDUB or when w(p)U(2) + (1 − w(p))U(1.6) >
w(p)U(3.85) + (1− w(p))U(0.1). Re-arranging, one can see that option A is chosen when:
w(p)
1− w(p) <
U(1.6)− U(0.1)
U(3.85)− U(2) (1)
Equation (1) reveals two important facts. First, the choice between option A and B in the
H&L task is driven both by the shape of w(p) and the shape of U(x) - i.e., it does not
separately identify only the curvature of the utility function or the coefficient of relative risk
aversion as is often presumed. Second, equation (1) shows that, at most, one can identify
only two utility differences U(1.6) − U(0.1) and U(3.85) − U(2), which is clearly a small
amount of information to be gleaned about the shape of U(x).
To illustrate the first point, note that many experimental studies have estimated the
shape of w(p) using functional forms such as w(p) = pγ/[pγ + (1 − p)γ]1/γ. Estimates of γ
typically fall in the range of 0.56 to 0.71 (e.g., see Camerer and Ho, 1994; Tversky and
Kahneman, 1992; Wu and Gonzalez, 1996), which implies an S-shaped probability weighting
3One can of course utilize several MPLs and scale up the payoffs as H&L did to allow for a wider range
of dollar amounts (thus providing more information on the shape of the utility function). However, those
researchers interested in adding a quick and simple risk preference elicitation devise to their studies are
unlikely to want to add numerous MPLs simply to get an informed shape of the utility function.
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function that over-weights low probability events and under-weights high probability events.
Now, consider a simple example where individuals have a linear utility function (i.e.,
they are risk neutral in the traditional sense), U(x) = x. With the traditional H&L task, a
risk neutral person with U(x) = x and γ = 1 would switch from option A to B at the fifth
decision task. However, if the person weights probabilities non-linearly, say with a value of
γ = 0.6, then they would instead switch from option A to B at the sixth decision task. Thus,
in the original H&L decision task, an individual with γ = 0.6, will appear to have a concave
utility function (if one ignores probability weighting) even though they have a linear utility
function, U(x) = x. The problem is further exasperated as γ diverges from one. Of course in
reality, people may weight probabilities non-linearly and exhibit diminishing marginal utility
of earnings, but the point remains: simply observing the A-B switching point in the H&L
decision task is insufficient to identify the shape of U(x) and the shape of w(p). The two
are confounded. While it is possible to use data from the H&L technique to estimate these
two constructs, U(x) and w(p), ex post, we argue that more information is contained about
w(p) than U(x) in the original H&L MPL.
In addition to the above arguments that choices in the H&L MPL are likely to provide
more information on the shape of w(p) than U(x) relates to the moderate level of payoffs
used in many experiments using MPLs. Several authors have argued that the utility function
should be linear over relatively low payoff amounts (Selten et al., 1999; Wakker, 2010).4 If
true, this would suggest that the risk averse behavior previously observed in H&L tasks
may well relate to w(p) than to U(x). A final piece of evidence suggesting that the original
H&L task is more likely to elicit probability weights than utility curvature are the findings
that in repeated choice tasks people are more likely to pay attention to the factors changing
across the tasks (which in the case of H&L are the probabilities). Because probabilities are
4Rabin (2000) argues that, assuming EUT, anything but risk-neutrality over modest stakes implies absurd
levels of risk aversion over larger stakes. Cox and Sadiraj (2006) show that the same implications do not
follow for the EUT model of income but only for the terminal wealth model. Of course, there have been
several quibbles about this issue (Palacios-Huerta and Serrano, 2006; Rubinstein, 2006; Watt, 2002; Wakker,
2010, pp. 242-245).
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changing in the original H&L task, people are more likely to pay attention to this dimension
of choice (Bleichrodt, 2002).
2.1 A payoff-varying MPL
Given the preceding discussion, one might ask if there is a simple way to use a MPL that
yields more information about U(x) and, at least in some special cases, avoids the confound
between w(p) and U(x). One can indeed achieve such an outcome by following an approach
like the one used by Wakker and Deneffe (1996) in which probabilities are held constant.
Using this insight, we modify the H&L task such that probabilities remain constant across the
ten decision tasks and instead change the dollar payoffs down the ten tasks. Our approach is
similar to that used in prior research such as that by where certainty equivalents are elicited
from subjects by using repeated choices with varying payoff amounts (Cohen et al., 1987). 5
Table 2 shows a payoff-varying MPL. In this MPL, the probabilities of all payouts are held
constant at 0.5. We constructed the payoff-varying MPL shown in table 2 so that it matched
the original H&L MPL in terms of the coefficient of relative risk aversion (CRRA) implied by
a switch between choosing option A and option B under the assumption of expected utility
(EU) preferences.6
What are the advantages and disadvantages of the payoff-varying MPL compared to
the H&L MPL? At the onset, one can see that because the payoff-varying MPL only
utilizes one probability level, 0.5, it cannot reveal much about the shape of the proba-
bility weighting function. However, the payoff-varying MPL entails choices over 22 dif-
5There a few other papers that have constructed tasks that vary the payoff amounts and hold probabilities
constant albeit their aim was different than this paper. For example Bruner (2009) asks whether equivalent
changes in the expected value of a lottery achieved by either changing the probability of a reward or by
changing the reward itself, will be preferred by risk averse agents as predicted by EUT (he finds that they
do). More recently, Bosch-Dome`nech and Silvestre (2013) compare a standard H&L task with a task they
adopt from Abdellaoui et al. (2011) (which in turn is similar to the certainty equivalents method of Cohen
et al. (1987)) for embedding bias. They find that the H&L task is susceptible to embedding bias while the
Abdellaoui et al. (2011) task is not.
6For example, if an individual (with EU preferences) switched from choosing option A to option B on
the sixth row of the original H&L task, it would imply a CRRA between 0.14 and 0.41. Likewise, in the
payoff-varying MPL with constant probabilities, a switch from choosing option A to option B on the sixth
row would also imply (assuming EU preferences) a CRRA between 0.14 and 0.41.
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Table 2: Payoff-varying MPL with Constant Probabilities
Lottery A Lottery B EVA
(e)
EVB
(e)
Difference
(e)
Open CRRA interval if
subject switches to Lot-
tery B (assumes EUT)p e p e p e p e
0.5 1.68 0.5 1.60 0.5 2.01 0.5 1.00 1.640 1.506 0.13 −∞ -1.71
0.5 1.76 0.5 1.60 0.5 2.17 0.5 1.00 1.680 1.583 0.10 -1.71 -0.95
0.5 1.84 0.5 1.60 0.5 2.32 0.5 1.00 1.720 1.658 0.06 -0.95 -0.49
0.5 1.92 0.5 1.60 0.5 2.48 0.5 1.00 1.760 1.738 0.02 -0.49 -0.15
0.5 2.00 0.5 1.60 0.5 2.65 0.5 1.00 1.800 1.827 -0.03 -0.15 0.14
0.5 2.08 0.5 1.60 0.5 2.86 0.5 1.00 1.840 1.932 -0.09 0.14 0.41
0.5 2.16 0.5 1.60 0.5 3.14 0.5 1.00 1.880 2.068 -0.19 0.41 0.68
0.5 2.24 0.5 1.60 0.5 3.54 0.5 1.00 1.920 2.272 -0.35 0.68 0.97
0.5 2.32 0.5 1.60 0.5 4.50 0.5 1.00 1.960 2.748 -0.79 0.97 1.37
0.5 2.40 0.5 1.60 0.5 4.70 0.5 1.00 2.000 2.852 -0.85 1.37 +∞
Note: Last four columns showing expected values and implied CRRA intervals were not
shown to subjects.
ferent dollar payouts. To consider these ideas more formally, again assume individuals
have rank-dependent preferences and note that option A will be chosen over option B if
w(0.5)U(AH) + (1 − w(0.5))U(1.6) > w(0.5)U(BH) + (1 − w(0.5))U(1), where AH and BH
are the higher payoffs for options A and B, respectively (values which changes over the 10
decision tasks), and where AH > 1.6, BH > 1, and BH > AH . Re-arranging terms, one can
see that option A is chosen if:
w(0.5)
1− w(0.5) <
U(1.6)− U(1)
U(BH)− U(AH) (2)
Comparing equation (2) with equation (1), one can see that the original H&L task can
utilize 10 points to estimate the function for w(p) but by contrast, the payoff-varying task
can only estimate a single point, w(0.5). In contrast, whereas the original H&L task can
only estimate two utility differences, the payoff-varying task can estimate 11. Thus, the
payoff-varying MPL reveals more information about the shape of U(x) than the original
H&L MPL, but the original H&L MPL reveals more information about the shape of w(p)
than does the payoff-varying task.7
7There is one additional feature of the payoff-varying MPL shown in Table 2 that bears mention. Al-
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3 Experiment
To investigate some of the issues discussed above, a laboratory experiment was conducted
to compare behavior in the original H&L MPL and our payoff-varying MPL. Moreover, the
experiment was designed to see which MPL (or whether a combination of the two) could
better predict a hold-out sample of choices. The next sub-section describes the subjects,
recruiting, and experimental environment. Then, we describe the different treatments used
in the study.
3.1 Description of the experiment set-up
A lab experiment was conducted using the z-Tree software (Fischbacher, 2007). Subjects
consisted of undergraduate students at the University of Ioannina, Greece and were recruited
using the ORSEE recruiting system (Greiner, 2004). During the recruitment, subjects were
told that they would be given the chance to make more money during the experiment.8
Harrison et al. (2009) have shown that stochastic and non-stochastic fees can significantly
affect self-selection of subjects with respect to risk attitudes.
Subjects participated in sessions of group sizes that varied from 9 to 11 subjects per ses-
sion (all but two sessions involved groups of 10 subjects). In total, 100 subjects participated
in 10 sessions that were conducted between December 2011 and January 2012. Each session
though it does not totally do away with the aforementioned confound between w(p) and U(x) when we
assume rank-dependent preferences, the confound completely disappears if people weight probabilities as
in original prospect theory. In this case, in the payoff-varying MPL people will choose option A when
w(0.5)U(AH) + w(0.5)U(1.6) > w(0.5)U(BH) + w(0.5)U(1). One can divide both sides of this inequal-
ity by w(0.5) to see that option A will be chosen when U(AH) + U(1.6) > U(BH) + U(1), or rewriting:
1 < U(1.6)−U(1)
U(BH)−U(AH) . This last inequality does not contain the term w(0.5), thus, the choice of option A over B
cannot be explained by probability weighting. Stated differently, even if an individual weights probabilities
non-linearly in the fashion given by original prospect theory, only the shape of U(x) will dictate their choices
in the payoff-varying MPL shown in Table 2. This condition could only be obtained because of our choice
of the probability value 0.5. For any other probability value the weighting function does not drop out and
the confound remains. Thus, in the original H&L task (which uses probabilities from 0 to 1), the confound
between w(p) and U(x) remains even if preferences are given by original prospect theory. Note that since
most empirical estimates suggest that w(0.3) ≈ 0.3, it is possible to also use this empirical relation to create
a MPL that avoids probability weighting.
8Subjects were told that “In addition to a fixed fee of 10, you will have a chance of receiving additional
money up to 25. This will depend on the decisions you make during the experiment.”
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lasted about 45 minutes and subjects were paid a 10eparticipation fee. Subjects were given
a power point presentation explaining the risk preferences tasks as well as printed copies of
instructions. They were also initially given a five-choice training task to familiarize them
with the choice screens that would appear in the real task. Subjects were told that choices
in the training phase would not count toward their earnings and that this phase was purely
hypothetical.
Full anonymity was ensured by asking subjects to choose a unique three-digit code from a
jar. The code was then entered at an input stage once the computerized experiment started.
The experimenter only knew correspondence between digit codes and profits. Profits and
participation fees were put in sealed envelopes (the digit code was written on the outside) and
were exchanged with printed digit codes at the end of the experiment. No names were asked
at any point of the experiment. Subjects were told that their decisions were independent
from other subjects, and that they could finish the experiment at their own convenience.
Average total payouts including lottery earnings were 15.2e (S.D.=4.56).
3.2 Risk preference elicitation
Our experiment entailed a 2x2 within-subject design, where each subject completed two
different multiple price lists (MPL) at two payout (low vs. high) amounts. As shown in
Table 3, the baseline (or control) involved the original H&L task at their low payoff amounts
(a task we refer to as H&L1).
Table 3: Treatments in experiment
Payout
Multiple Price List low(x1) high (x5)
H&L H&L1 H&L5
payoff-varying MPL with constant probabilities pvMPL1 pvMPL5
Hold-out task H1 H5
The baseline H&L MPL presented subjects with a choice between two lotteries, A or B.
For each lottery choice shown in Table 1, a subject chose A, B or could state indifference
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between A and B. The last choice shown in Table 1 is a simple test of whether subjects
understood the instructions correctly.9 The second treatment (H&L5) is identical to the
first (H&L1) except that all payouts are scaled up by a magnitude of five.
In addition to the choices in treatments H&L1 and H&L5, subjects also completed the
payoff-varying MPL shown in Table 2 (pvMPL1) and another set of choices identical to
the ones shown in Table 2 except that all payoffs were scaled up by a magnitude of five
(pvMPL5).
Instead of providing a table of choices arrayed in an ordered manner all appearing on
the same page as in H&L, each choice was presented separately showing probabilities and
prizes (as in Andersen et al., 2011b). Subjects could move back and forth between screens
in a given table but not between tables. Once all ten choices in a table were made, the table
was effectively inaccessible. The order of appearance of the treatments for each subject was
completely randomized to avoid order effects (Harrison et al., 2005). An example of one of
the decision tasks is shown in Figure 1.
One of the implicit arguments made thus far is that the original H&L task can better
estimate the probability weighting function and the payoff-varying MPL can better estimate
the utility function. As such, a combination of the insights attained by the two approaches
might result in a better overall model. To determine whether this combination is indeed
“better” than either used alone, we used out-of-sample prediction as our measure of perfor-
mance. Thus, as shown in Table 3, the study also included two hold-out tasks which we use
as the basis of measuring prediction performance. We constructed these hold-out tasks by
creating yet another MPL that modified the original H&L design such that the probability
of receiving the higher payout option increased nonlinearly down the list (see Table 4). The
MPL is constructed so that it matched the original H&L task in terms of the coefficient of
relative risk aversion (CRRA) implied by a switch between choosing option A and option
B under the assumption that subjects have prospect-theory preferences where they weigh
916 out of 100 subjects failed to pass this test concerning comprehension of lotteries and were omitted
from our sample.
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Figure 1: Example Decision Task
probabilities nonlinearly with w(p) = p0.6/[p0.6 + (1− p)0.6]1/0.6.
Because each subject completed three MPLs (with 10 choices each) at two payouts, they
each made 60 binary choices. For each subject, one of the 60 choices was randomly chosen
and paid out.
4 Data analysis and results
4.1 Descriptive analysis
Figure 2 illustrates the proportion of subjects choosing option A for the original H&L
task and the payoff-varying task for small and large payoff amounts. Note that all four
tasks were designed to elicit the same switching point for a given risk aversion coefficient
under the assumption of expected utility preferences (an assumption we will show later to
be descriptively invalid).
The two H&L tasks and the pvMPL5 tasks, imply significant risk averse behavior as
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Table 4: Holdout Task
Lottery A Lottery B EVA
(e)
EVB
(e)
Difference
(e)
Open CRRA interval if
subject switches to Lot-
tery B (assumes EUT)p e p e p e p e
0.03 2.00 0.97 1.60 0.03 3.85 0.97 0.10 1.610 0.194 1.42 −∞ -1.71
0.09 2.00 0.91 1.60 0.09 3.85 0.91 0.10 1.636 0.439 1.20 -1.71 -0.95
0.20 2.00 0.80 1.60 0.20 3.85 0.80 0.10 1.678 0.835 0.84 -0.95 -0.49
0.34 2.00 0.66 1.60 0.34 3.85 0.66 0.10 1.735 1.365 0.37 -0.49 -0.15
0.50 2.00 0.50 1.60 0.50 3.85 0.50 0.10 1.800 1.975 -0.17 -0.15 0.14
0.66 2.00 0.34 1.60 0.66 3.85 0.34 0.10 1.865 2.585 -0.72 0.14 0.41
0.80 2.00 0.20 1.60 0.80 3.85 0.20 0.10 1.922 3.116 -1.19 0.41 0.68
0.91 2.00 0.09 1.60 0.91 3.85 0.09 0.10 1.964 3.512 -1.55 0.68 0.97
0.97 2.00 0.03 1.60 0.97 3.85 0.03 0.10 1.990 3.756 -1.77 0.97 1.37
1 2.00 0 1.60 1 3.85 0 0.10 2.000 3.850 -1.85 1.37 +∞
Note: Last four columns showing expected values and implied CRRA intervals were not
shown to subjects.
subjects switch, on average, far after task four. However, for the low-payoff payoff-varying
task, pvMPL1, where probabilities are held constant, a different picture emerges. Subjects
exhibit what appears to be risk loving behavior in the constant-probability task than the
risk averse behavior in the conventional H&L task.
One striking difference in pvMPL1 task is the fact that the percent choosing option A
remains at about 50% for the first five decision task, and, in fact, slightly increases over this
range. One explanation for this trend is that the payoff-varying task generated more multiple
switching points than the standard H&L task.10 If we calculate the number of choices that
violate monotonicity, we find that the average subject made 0.21 and 0.11 such violations
in the original H&L task at low and high payouts, respectively. By contrast, in our payoff-
varying MPL tasks with constant probabilities, the average subject made 0.85 and 0.69 such
violations in the low and high payout tasks, respectively. Over the first few choices in the
payoff-varying decision task at low payoffs (pvMPL1), the difference in the expected values
between lottery options A and B were relatively small, and this might partially explain why
10In our experiment, we did not impose monotonicity on choices or provide warnings when monotonicity
was violated. Although such a procedure could be implemented, it is unclear if it is superior to simply
observing how people behave when unconstrained.
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Figure 2: Percentage of respondents choosing option A for each decision task
the task generated more switching behavior. However, it should be noted that such small
differences in expected values were required to generate the same implied CRRA intervals
as the original H&L task given the overall payout magnitudes. Thus, this is not a feature
of the payoff-varying task per se but rather a feature of constant relative risk aversion and
expected utility theory applied to lotteries with payouts of the magnitude considered in
the original H&L task but with constant probabilities. Importantly, we have analyzed our
data removing individuals that significantly violated monotonicity (i.e., made three or more
inconsistent choices), and our econometric estimates (discussed momentarily) are virtually
unchanged.
Figure 2 also illustrates the effects of scaling off payoffs. For the traditional H&L task,
increasing payoffs had very little effect on the percentage of times option A was chosen.
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However, increasing payoffs had a much larger effect on our payoff-varying MPL. The issue
of monotonicity does not appear as problematic in the payoff-varying MPL when payoffs are
scaled up by a factor of five. This might be because the expected value differences between
options A and B (shown in table 2) are also scaled up by a factor of five in this task.
4.2 Econometric modeling approach
To explore the results in terms of the curvature of the utility and probability weighting
functions, we utilize the random utility approach also used by Andersen et al. (2008) and
use the rank-dependent utility model as the base-line model of analysis. We let the random
rank-dependent utility of option k experienced by individual i in choice j be: V kij = Z
k
ij + ε
k
ij
for k = A,B where εij is a stochastic error term assumed to be known to the individual but
unobservable to the analyst. ZAij and Z
B
ij are the systematic portions of the utility functions
assumed to follow rank-dependent preferences, i.e., ZAij = w(pj)U(A
H
j ) + (1− w(pj))U(ALj ),
where AHj is the high payoff and A
L
j is the low payoff for option A in choice j (and likewise
for ZBij ).
The probability of option A being chosen over option B can be given by PAij = Φ((Z
A
ij −
ZBij )/σ), where the difference in the error terms is distributed i.i.d. normal with standard
deviation equal to σ. Thus, a log likelihood function can be defined for estimation: LF =∑N
i=1
∑J
j=1[yijln(P
A
ij ) + (1 − yij)ln(1 − PAij )] where yij = 1 if option A is chosen, yij = 0 if
option B is chosen and yij = 0.5 if an individual indicates indifference to A and B.
In the analyses that follow, we consider several specifications for w(p) and U(x). The
base-line specifications for the utility function is the constant relative risk aversion specifica-
tion: U(x) = x
1−r
1−r , where r is the coefficient of relative risk aversion.
11 In the payoff-varying
MPLs we have many more points on the utility function and can also estimate an expo-power
11In the original H&L task, we can also estimate a “non-parametric” utility function and instead estimate
the two utility differences shown in equation (1): [U(1.6) − U(0.1)] and [U(3.85) − U(2)]. In this latter
case, however, the standard deviation, σ, is no longer separately identified and must be normalized to one.
In the H&L MPL, this formulation is actually observationally equivalent to the CRRA specification with σ
freely estimated; both utility specifications give identical maximum likelihood function values and probability
weighting estimates. These results are shown in the appendix Table A.1.
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utility function (Saha, 1993): U(x) = (1− exp(−αx1−r))/α.
For the probability weighting function in the H&L MPLs, we consider the function used
by Tversky and Kahneman (1992) and others: w(p) = pγ/[pγ+(1−p)γ]1/γ. We also estimated
the probability weighting function proposed by Prelec (1998): w(p) = exp(−β(−ln(p)τ )).
For the payoff-varying MPL, there is only a single probability point and thus we need only
estimate a single parameter, θ, representing the weight placed on the 0.5 probability, i.e.,
w(0.5) = θ.
We estimated each of these competing specifications separately for high and low payoffs
(note: likelihood ratio tests reject the hypothesis of equality of parameters across high and
low payoffs for each specification). Moreover, we used the AIC and BIC model selection
criteria to determine the best fitting model for each dataset.
4.3 Econometric Results
For the traditional H&L MPLs, each of the aforementioned model variations was esti-
mated (see the appendix Table A.1). For both high and low payoffs, the AIC and BIC model
selection criteria indicate a preference for the rank-dependent models over the prospect-
theory models. Within the rank-dependent models, the Tversky and Kahneman (1992)
probability weighting function is preferred to the Prelec (1998) weighting function according
to the AIC and BIC.
The preferred model for both the H&L1 and H&L5 treatments is the CRRA model with
the Tversky and Kahneman (1992) probability weighting function. For low-payoffs, the
estimate of the coefficient of relative risk aversion (r = 0.004) was not statistically different
from zero, but the estimated parameter on the probability weighting function, γ = 0.501,
was statistically different from one, indicating a rejection of the expected utility model in
favor of the rank-dependent model. Similarly, for high-payoffs, the coefficient of relative risk
aversion (r = −0.135) was not statistically different from zero, but the estimated parameter
on the probability weighting function,γ = 0.45, was statistically different from one. Thus, at
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least for our subjects, the apparent risk averse behavior shown in Figure 2 is solely a result of
probability weighting rather than utility function curvature for the conventional H&L tasks.
The implication is that practitioners using the H&L task to infer curvature of the utility
function would have arrived at erroneous conclusions had they not also jointly estimated the
extent to which people weight probabilities non-linearly.
Figure 3 plots the estimated probability weighting functions for the low-payoff H&L1
MPL. In addition to the two aforementioned functional forms, we also show the results
of a “non-parametric” estimation in which a single parameter is estimated for each of the
11 probability points available in the H&L task (with the lowest normalized to zero and
the highest normalized to one). Although the “non parametric” form is not preferred to the
parametric forms according to AIC and BIC, the results reveal the level of information about
probability weights obtainable from the H&L task. In all specifications, the results reveal
significant over-weighting of low probability events and under-weighting of high probability
events.
Turning to the payoff-varying MPLs, the AIC and BIC indicate that the most preferred
models (see full results in appendix Table A.2) are the models assuming constant relative risk
aversion with the error variance normalized to one for both the low and high payoff tasks.
The results reveal that at low payoffs, the coefficient of relative risk aversion (r = 0.116) was
not statistically different from zero and the estimated weight applied to probability 0.50 was
w(0.5) = 0.581, a difference (0.581 − 0.50 = 0.081) which is not statistically different from
zero, implying linear probability weighting in the vicinity of p = 0.5. Taken together, for
low payoffs, the estimates imply near risk-neutral behavior for the payoff-varying MPL.
At high payoffs, however, a different picture emerges. For our payoff-varying MPL which
utilizes much more variation over payoff amounts than the H&L task, we find that for
high payoffs, a statistically significant estimate for the coefficient of relative risk aversion
(r = 0.233) emerges. Moreover, we find that the estimated weight applied to probability
0.50 was w(0.5) = 0.366. This estimate of probability weighing is very similar to that implied
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by the high-payoff H&L task (with γ = 0.45, the H&L5 task implies w(0.5) = 0.313).
4.4 Prediction performance
Because of the larger variation in probabilities in the H&L task, we have argued that this
task should yield better estimates of the curvature of the probability weighting function. By
contrast, because of the larger variation in the dollar amounts in our payoff-varying MPL,
we have argued that this task should yield better estimates of the curvature of the utility
function. To put these conjectures to the test, we now see how well the aforementioned
estimates are able to predict the holdout tasks at low (H1) and high (H2) payoff amounts.
In particular, we compare the predictive performance of three models: i) a model based
on the estimate of r and γ from the H&L MPL, ii) a model based on the estimate of r (and
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for lack of a better choice assuming γ = 1) from the pvMPL, and finally iii) a composite
model in which we use the estimate of r from our payoff-varying MPL and the estimate of γ
from the H&L MPL.12 To judge predictive fit, we use two criteria: 1) the percent of correct
predictions and 2) the value of the likelihood function observed at out-of-sample values —
the out-of-sample log-likelihood function (OSLLF). The out-of-sample log-likelihood function
approach has long been used in the marketing literature for model selection (Erdem, 1996;
Roy et al., 1996) and further elucidated in the economics literature (Norwood, Lusk, and
Brorsen, 2004; Norwood, Roberts, and Lusk, 2004). The OSLLF has desirable properties in
judging the predictive fit of discrete choice models and it is our preferred selection criteria.
Table 5 shows the performance of the three models in predicting the out-of-sample hold-
out choices. For low payoffs, the composite model generates the same % correct predictions
but has a lower OSLLF than the H&L MPL. Although a paired-test indicates no significant
difference in the composite-model and H&L1 OSLLF values, the non-parametric sign-rank
test indicates the two are significantly different (p-value< 0.01). The composite model
outperforms the pvMPL both in terms of percent of correct predictions and in terms of
OSLLF (both the t-test and signed-rank test indicate OSLLFs are significantly different at
p < 0.01 level).
A similar result is obtained for the high-payoff values. Although all three models generate
similar performance in terms of the percentage of correct predictions, the composite model
far outperforms the H&L5 and pvMPL5 tasks in isolation according to the OSLLF values
(the composite model yields significantly different OSLLF values as compared to the H&L5
and pvMPL5 tasks according to t-tests and signed-rank tests at the p < 0.01 level).
Taken together, the results in Table 5 largely confirm our intuition that better predictions
12Our composite model takes the estimate of the curvature of the probability weighting from the H&L
task and the estimate of the curvature of the utility function from the payoff-varying MPL. An alternative
approach is to pool the two data sets and estimate a combined model. When we do this for the low payoff
task, we find an estimate of r = 0.3249 and γ = 0.6904, and σ = 0.5883, all of which are significantly
different from zero. However, this model exhibits significantly poorer out of sample predictions with the
OSLLF= −0.5222 and % correct predictions=76.42% than the composite model discussed in the main text.
A similar result holds for the high payoff task.
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Table 5: Out-of-sample prediction performance of three competing models
H&L predictions pvMPL predictions Composite model predictions
low payoffs
OSLLF -0.4068 -0.4677 -0.4025
% correct 83.57% 76.43% 83.57%
high payoffs
OSLLF -0.4696 -1.0565 -0.3876
% correct 83.09% 83.09% 82.60%
can be made by using the H&L task to infer the curvature of the probability weighting
function and the payoff-varying MPL to infer the curvature of the utility function.
5 The Random Lottery Incentive Mechanism
In our experiment subjects were paid for one out of 60 tasks. There is a caveat with this
payoff mechanism that we haven’t discussed so far. One line of criticism with the Random
Lottery Incentive Mechanism (RLIM) as first put forward by Holt (1986), is that given the
reduction axiom, RLIM is incentive compatible if and only if the Independence Axiom holds.
Given that RDU does not include the independence axiom, then RLIM is inappropriate on
theoretical grounds. Starmer and Sugden (1991) investigated the empirical validity of Holt’s
(1986) critique. They designed an experiment to test whether subjects’ behavior under the
RLIM is consistent with the reduction axiom. They rejected the reduction axiom i.e., that
subjects make every decision as if the whole experiment is one big lottery over which they
are optimizing.
The results in Starmer and Sugden (1991) are not to say that the RLIM is immune to
cross-task contamination since reduction is just the extreme case of such contamination.
Cubitt et al. (1998) extended the work of Starmer and Sugden (1991) by generating data
from an experiment with more than two choice tasks (contamination may be more of an
issue with many choice tasks). They found “...no evidence of cross-task contamination in
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the random lottery design.” Further evidence in favor of the separation hypothesis as well
as against cross-task contamination are provided in Hey and Lee (2005b) and Hey and Lee
(2005a), respectively.
The RLIM has since been used without second thought by many experimental economists
with only few exceptions (see for example the discussion in the Appendix in Conlisk (1989)).
Admittedly, either the Independence Axiom holds or it does not. This concern is not specific
to our study but to the hundreds of studies that have used the RLIM (and introduced a
theoretical confound) when they set out to test non-EUT alternatives. Researchers have
different views about this issue. For example, Wakker (2007) argued that this issue has
unduly hindered many papers in the review process and that it is counter-productive to
re-hash the issue each and every time.
The random selection mechanism has been favored because it is known to avoid wealth
and portfolio effects that arise with alternative payoff mechanisms, such as if one decides to
pay all decisions sequentially during the experiment or all decisions at the end of the experi-
ment. No incentive-payment scheme is likely to be a “holy grail” and the RLIM has emerged
as the mechanism that best compromises all the competing issues. However, criticism of the
RLIM seems to have been continually debated, with referees invoking arguments along the
lines of Holt (1986) which obviously prompted Hey and Lee (2005b) to explicitly conclude
that: “...experimenters can continue to use the random lottery incentive mechanism and
that this paper can be used as a defense against referees who argue that the procedure is
unsafe”.
In essence, researchers that use the RLIM under non-EUT specifications invoke the as-
sumption of the isolation effect i.e., that a subject views each choice in an experiment as
independent of other choices in the experiment. If the isolation assumption holds, then RLIM
is incentive compatible even under non-EUT specifications. However, if the isolation effect
does not hold, then there is no alternative for multi-decision experiments where behavior
departs from EUT. The debate then boils down to an empirical question of whether the
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isolation effect holds or not.
As mentioned above, several studies have defended the validity of RLIM. Nevertheless,
the issue has been re-opened recently by one group of researchers (Cox et al., 2014; Harrison
and Swarthout, 2012). Cox et al. (2014) tested a one-task (OT) decision environment which
is the only alternative payoff mechanism that is valid under any behavioral decision theory.
In OT, a subject makes one (and only one) choice and is paid for that one choice. However,
this task is practically infeasible with our design. Cox et al. (2014) use five lottery pairs and
in five out of their six treatments, subjects make choices between all five lottery pairs. Each of
these treatments employs a sample size of roughly 40 subjects. To make things comparable,
their OT treatment employs a sample size roughly five times of that employed in the other
treatments (5 lottery pairs×40 subjects≈231 subjects). Given that our experiment entails
each subject making choices between 60 lottery pairs, the sample size implied by the rule of
thumb in Cox et al. (2014) is 6000 subjects! That’s far beyond many researchers’ resources
combined. In addition, our research is implicitly about multiple price lists (MPL), and by
definition, MPLs entail several repeated choices between ordered lotteries. Thus, even from
a practical standpoint, it is unclear to us how a OT design could successfully critique a MPL,
which (rightly or wrongly) has become the most popular method for providing an index of
risk preferences.
Furthermore, a OT design precludes within-subjects hypothesis tests, since in such ex-
periments a subject only makes one decision. Another assumption is therefore required per-
taining to homogeneous preferences across subjects (or at least large samples with adequate
randomization to treatment). Harrison and Swarthout (2012) point out that “...plausible
estimates of the degree of heterogeneity in the typical population imply massive sample sizes
for reasonable power, well beyond those of most experiments.” The implications for exper-
imental practice, in terms of the cost of having much larger sample sizes coupled with the
need to conduct high stakes experiments, are profound.
So how can one ease concerns about the use of RLIM under non-EUT? First, in the
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context of our experiment, it seems implausible to assume a priori that subjects are so-
phisticated enough to consider the whole experiment as being one single question. We can
reasonably assume that such overall optimization over 60 tasks could easily exceed subjects’
information processing capacities. In the words of Hey and Lee (2005b), if the subjects were
choosing the best strategy for the experiment as a whole then they would have to choose
between 260 different strategies (ignoring the fact that a third option of indifference was also
available), which seems unlikely.
A more plausible pattern of choices would be cross-task contamination in the form of
serially-correlated responses that are inconsistent with isolation. To tackle this issue we
used the procedures set forth in Hey and Lee (2005a). Hey and Lee (2005a) advance three
hypothesis which they call Mark 0, Mark 1 and Mark 2, respectively. Mark 0 advances the
isolation hypothesis i.e., subjects view each task independently of other choice tasks. Under
Mark 1 the subject considers all past choice tasks but treats the current task as if it is the
last one. Under Mark 2 the subject considers the past tasks but treats all forthcoming tasks
as if these are going to be similar to the current task. Under EUT the subject should behave
the same under the three marks but not under RDU. As in Hey and Lee (2005a) we check
to see which of the three hypotheses appears to be most consistent with the data.
We used a maximum score (MS) method of estimation for two different preference func-
tionals: the parametric EUT with a CRRA utility function and the corresponding RDU
functional. These are the two functionals that were favored by our data (see Tables A.1
and A.2 in the paper). The MS method involves choosing the parameters of the preference
functionals (r for EUT and r, γ for RDU) in such a way that the number of correct predic-
tions (of the subject’s behavior) is maximized. Our algorithm iteratively tried all possible
values of r in the interval [-7, 7] with a step of 0.001 and all possible values of γ in the interval
[0.2, 3] with a step of 0.01 to obtain a maximum score. This maximization was performed
for each subject (77 subjects),13 per mark (Mark 0, Mark 1, Mark 2) and per preference
13This number is 7 subjects less than the 84 subjects that were used in our original estimations reported
in Tables A.1 and A.2 in the paper. Subjects that expressed at least one indifference when choosing between
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functional (EUT and RDU).
To compare between preference functionals we then converted the maximum scores into
(corrected) log-likelihoods as in Hey and Lee (2005a). Table 6 below displays average and
total corrected log-likelihoods (corrected to account for the number of different parameters
between the EUT and RDU functionals).
Table 6: Average and total corrected log-likelihoods
EUT RDU
Mark 0 Mark 1 Mark 2 Mark 0 Mark 1 Mark 2
Average -26.2684 -26.2684 -26.2684 -26.1162 -25.6111 -26.0292
Total -2022.67 -2022.67 -2022.67 -2010.95 -1972.05 -2004.25
First, note that the RDU functional is to be preferred, which is consistent to what we
have already found in Tables A.1 and A.2. Although it appears that both Mark 1 and
Mark 2 (which are consistent with some form of cross task contamination) are favored when
compared with Mark 0 (which is consistent with the isolation hypothesis), a closer look at
our results reveals that this average behavior is being driven by 19 subjects for which we
can clearly reject the isolation hypothesis. For the rest of the subjects (58 subjects), Mark
0 does equally well as Mark 1 and Mark 2.
We then re-estimated our models without the 19 subjects who showed evidence of vio-
lation of the isolation effect and we also removed the 7 subjects that expressed at least one
indifference and were excluded from the maximum score estimation. As shown in Table A.3,
including or excluding the subjects that do not isolate and/or the subjects with indifferent
choices, makes little difference to our results and conclusions. Although the main point of
our paper is not specific to the RLIM and incentive compatibility, our conclusions, methods
and main point of the paper remain intact.
An additional issue with the RLIM is that presenting the payment scheme as a random
lottery may dilute incentives if expected earnings become negligible. Harrison (1994) uses
lotteries were dropped from the maximum score estimation due to the inability of the method of ever
predicting an indifference correctly.
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this doctrine as the basis of a critique of the random lottery design and points out that
in a random lottery experiment the incentives offered by the face values of the options are
diluted by the fact that each task has only a small probability of being binding. While this
practice is common in the literature, it is rarely evaluated. We are aware of only one study
that varied the probability of payment for a discounting task from 10% to 100% and found
no significant difference in the responses between these treatments (Andersen et al., 2011b).
Several other studies have used a RLIM without second thought about diluted incentives.
For example, in Andersen et al. (2013) there were 40 discounting choices and 40 risk attitude
choices, and each subject had a 10% chance of being paid for one of each set. Similarly, in
Andersen et al. (2011a) there were 40 discounting choices, 40 atemporal risk attitude choices
and 40 intertemporal risk attitude choices, and each subject had a 10% chance of being paid
for one choice in each set of 40 choices. In Harrison et al. (2009) there was a 10% chance of
having 1 out of 40 choices realized. In Cheung (2013), 1 out of 40 risk preference tasks was
paid and 1 out of 80 time preference tasks was paid. For half of the time preference tasks,
the prizes were given with a 50% probability. Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) administered
87 choice tasks. Each of the first 45 choice tasks had 1/47 chance of being binding, each
of 22 choices had 1/(47*22) chance of being binding and the next 20 choices had 1/(47*20)
chance of being binding. Thus, our study does not differ significantly with other studies in
terms of monetary incentives. Whether paying one task randomly results in a problem of
diluted incentives, remains a problem that requires proper evaluation in future studies.
6 Conclusion
Although H&L introduced a useful tool for characterizing risk taking behavior, their
approach is limited in being able to identify why a particular behavior under risk was ob-
served. Risk averse behavior could result from curvature of the utility function, curvature of
the probability weighting function, or both. The obvious implication is that caution should
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be taken in directly using a single number like “number of safe choices” from H&Ls risk pref-
erence elicitation method to infer curvature of the utility function, the theoretical concept
that is often of interest, because risk averse behavior may be driven by probability weighting.
In fact, we show that, if anything, the H&L task is probably best suited to measuring the
curvature of the probability weighting function.
We constructed a modified version of the H&L task which held probabilities constant at
0.50 and provided much more variation in the payoff amounts. By providing more varia-
tion in payoff amounts, we hoped to obtain better estimates of the curvature of the utility
function. By and large, that’s what our experimental results imply. At both low and high
payoff amounts, econometric estimates suggest that behavior is almost totally driven by the
curvature of the probability weighting function (the estimated CRRA is not significantly
different from zero in either case). Only with our payoff-varying MPL under high payoffs
did we observe significant curvature in the utility function.
To test our intuition about the relative merits of the two elicitation approaches, we
sought to determine whether a composite model that combined the estimate of the curvature
of the utility function from our payoff-varying MPL with the estimate of the curvature of
the probability weighting function from the H&L task would exhibit better out-of-sample
prediction performance with a hold-out task than either model used in isolation. Our results
implied that the composite model did indeed generate lower OSLLF values than the estimates
from the conventional H&L task or the MPL used alone.
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Table A.2: Competing estimates for the pvMPL1 and pvMPL5 tasks
CRRA normalized CRRA expo power
low payoff
r -0.610 (1.518) 0.116 (0.180) 0.368 (1.341)
θ — — -0.340 (2.275)
w(0.5) 0.517** (0.153) 0.581** (0.072) 0.581** (0.074)
σ 2.376 (4.339) 1 1
LLF -539.6 -539.7 -539.65
AIC 1085.2 1083.4 1085.3
BIC 1099.4 1092.9 1099.5
high payoff
r 1.022 (0.949) 0.233** (0.030) -0.083 (0.171)
θ — — 0.048** (0.009)
w(0.5) 0.526** (0.192) 0.366** (0.011) 0.434** (0.062)
σ 0.134 (0.337) 1 1
LLF -477.1 -477.45 -476.9
AIC 960.2 958.9 959.8
BIC 974.4 968.4 974
Note: **(*) Statistically significant at the 5%(10%) level.
Numbers in parenthesis denote standard errors.
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